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Tuesday, April 10, 2018

US draft resolution on Douma



The Security Council,
PP1. Recalling the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC), and its resolutions 2401 (2018), 2319 (2016), 2314 (2016), 2253 (2015), 2235 (2015), 2209 (2015), 2178 (2014), 2118 (2013), 1989 (2011), 1540 (2004) and 1267 (1999),
PP2. Noting that additional allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria continue to be investigated by the Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),  
PP3. Expressing deep concern at the alleged use of chemical weapons in the Douma area outside Damascus in the Syrian Arab Republic on 7 April 2018 reportedly causing large-scale loss of life and injuries, affirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,
PP4. Noting that the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) has announced, in addition to its ongoing investigation, that its Fact Finding Mission (FFM) is in the process of gathering and analyzing information on this incident from all available sources and will report its findings to States Parties to the CWC,
PP5. Condemning in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and expressing grave concern that civilians continue to be killed and injured by chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,
PP6. Recalling that the Syrian Arab Republic acceded to the CWC, noting that the use of any toxic chemical, such as chlorine, as a chemical weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic is a violation of resolution 2118, and further noting that any such use by the Syrian Arab Republic would constitute a violation of the CWC,
PP7. Reaffirming their grave concern that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh) and other individuals, groups, undertakings, and entities associated with ISIL (Da’esh) or Al-Qaida, including but not limited to foreign terrorist fighters who have joined ISIL (Da’esh in Syria, groups that have pledged allegiance to ISIL (Da’esh), and Al-Nusra Front (ANF), continue operating in the Syrian Arab Republic,
PP8. Emphasizing the importance of conducting an independent, impartial and transparent investigation that examines relevant evidence with professionalism, and including, where safety and security permits, in coordination with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security and the OPCW, safe travel to sites the investigators deem relevant to the investigation, which could include but is not limited to the site of the alleged attack, and where the investigators determine there are reasonable grounds to believe access is justified based on their assessment of the facts and circumstances known to them at the time, when security conditions allow for safe access;
PP9. Recalling that the FFM is not mandated to reach conclusions about attributing responsibility for chemical weapons use,

1. Reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of any toxic chemical, including chlorine, as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic and expresses its outrage that civilians continue to be killed and injured by chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;
2. Reiterates that no party in the Syrian Arab Republic should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer chemical weapons;
3. Recalls its decision in resolution 2118 that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or, transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to other States or non-State actors;
4. Condemns in the strongest terms the continued reported use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the alleged use of chemical weapons in Douma on 7 April 2018,
5. Expresses its full support to the OPCW FFM, demands that all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic provide unhindered and safe access without delay to any sites deemed relevant by the OPCW FFM, and requests that the FFM report the results of its investigation of the alleged attack in Douma to the Director-General of the OPCW and to the Secretary-General as soon as practicable;
6. Reiterates its demand, reminding in particular the Syrian authorities, that all parties facilitate safe and unimpeded passage for medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their equipment, transport and supplies, including surgical items, to all people in need, particularly in Douma, consistent with international humanitarian law;
7. Decides to establish the United Nations Independent Mechanism of Investigation (UNIMI) for a period of one year with a possibility of further extension and update by the Security Council if it deems necessary;
8. Requests the United Nations Secretary-General, in coordination with the OPCW Director-General, to submit to the Security Council, for its authorization, within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, recommendations, including elements of Terms of Reference, regarding the establishment and operation of the UNIMI, based on the principles of impartiality, independence and professionalism, to identify to the greatest extent feasible, individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in the use of chemical weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, in the Syrian Arab Republic, and expresses its intent to respond to the recommendations, including Terms of Reference, within fifteen days of receipt;
9. Requests further that the United Nations Secretary-General, in coordination with the OPCW Director-General, undertake without delay steps, measures, and arrangements necessary for the speedy establishment and full functioning of the UNIMI, including recruiting impartial and experienced staff with relevant skills and expertise in accordance with the Terms of Reference, and notes due regard should be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as is possible;
10. Reaffirms support to the OPCW and UNIMI as they undertake their respective investigations in a manner they deem appropriate to fulfill their mandate, acknowledges the dangers associated with investigating chemical weapon use in Syria, and highlights the importance of full coordination with the United Nations Department of Safety and Security, and the OPCW, to ensure the FFM and UNIMI can safely travel to sites they deem relevant to their investigation, which could include but is not limited to the site of the alleged attack, where they determine there are reasonable grounds to believe access is justified based on their assessment of the facts and circumstances known to them at the time, when security conditions allow for safe access, and urges all Member States to facilitate such access where possible;
11. Requests the OPCW to provide UNIMI full access to all of the information and evidence obtained or prepared by the OPCW, including, but not limited to, medical records, interview tapes and transcripts, and documentary material, further reaffirms that the UNIMI should work in coordination with the OPCW to fulfill its mandate, and requests that the Secretary-General make the necessary arrangements for UNIMI to liaise closely with the OPCW to expeditiously investigate any incident the OPCW determines involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons in order to identify those involved in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of this resolution;
12. Calls upon all parties within the Syrian Arab Republic, to provide full cooperation with the FFM and UNIMI, and to facilitate immediate and unfettered, safe and secure access to witnesses, evidence, reporting, material and sites relevant to the investigation, in order for the FFM and the UNIMI to accomplish their mandates, further calls upon all parties to pause hostilities in the areas in which the FFM and the UNIMI require access in fulfillment of OP10, to enable where possible safe access for the FFM and the UNIMI to such sites, and encourages UNIMI to inform the Security Council in case they are unable to safely access sites that they deem necessary for their investigation;
13. Recalls its decision in paragraph 7 of resolution 2118 that the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and United Nations, including by complying with their relevant recommendations, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the United Nations, by providing for and ensuring the security of activities undertaken by these personnel, by providing these personnel with immediate and unfettered access to and the right to inspect, in discharging  their functions, any and all sites, and by allowing immediate and unfettered access to individuals that the OPCW has grounds to believe to be of importance for the purpose of its mandate, and specifically decides that all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully in that regard;
14. Requests the Secretary-General to report whether the information and access described in paragraph 13 of this resolution has been provided in his reports to the Security Council every 30 days pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 2118.
15. Encourages the UNIMI where relevant, to consult and cooperate with appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange information on non-State actors’ perpetration, organization, sponsorship or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;
16. Requests the UNIMI to retain any evidence related to possible use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic other than those cases in which the FFM determines or has determined that a specific incident in the Syrian Arab Republic involved or likely involved the use of chemicals as weapons, including chlorine or any other toxic chemical, and to transmit that evidence to the FFM through Director-General of the OPCW and to the Secretary-General as soon as practicable;
17. Requests the UNIMI to submit to the Security Council and the OPCW Executive Council its first report within 90 days of the date it commences its full operations, as notified by the United Nations Secretary-General, as well as subsequent reports on its investigations as appropriate thereafter;
18. Requests the Committee established pursuant to Resolution 1540 (2004) to analyze information on trends in the activities of non-State actors involving preparations for use and actual use of chemical weapons in Syria and transmit a report to the Security Council as appropriate;
19. Underlines that the Security Council will thoroughly assess how to take action following the UNIMI’s conclusions, and reaffirms in this regard its decision in response to violations of resolution 2118 to impose measures under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
20. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

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Russian draft resolution on Douma, OPCW


 April 10, 2018
The Security Council,
PP1. Recalling the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) ratified by the Syrian Arab Republic on 14 September 2013, and the Council’s resolutions 1540 (2004), 2118 (2013), 2209 (2015), 2235 (2015), 2314 (2016), and 2319 (2016).
PP2. Expressing its deep concern with regard to the alleged incident with use of toxic chemicals as weapon in Douma in the Syrian Arab Republic on 7 April 2018 reportedly causing large-scale loss of life and injuries, affirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law, and stressing that those responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable.
PP3. Condemning in the strongest terms any use of any toxic chemical as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic, and elsewhere.
PP4. Recalling that in resolution 2118 (2013) the Council decided that the Syrian Arab Republic shall not use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons, to other States or non-State actors and underscored that no party in Syria should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons.
PP5. Welcoming the readiness  of  the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to immediately send its Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to the site of the alleged incident in Douma to gather and analyse information on this incident and  report its findings to the OPCW Executive Council.
PP6. Taking note of the invitation of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic  to the FFM  experts to visit the site of the alleged incident in Douma without any delay.
PP7 Reaffirming its determination to identify and hold accountable  all those responsible for the use of chemicals as weapons on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.
PP8. Noting  with  due consideration  the assurances of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic  and the  military authorities of the Russian Federation in Syria to provide the FFM experts with full security arrangements for a safe access to the site of alleged incident in Douma.

OP1. Reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of any use of any toxic chemical as a weapon in the Syrian Arab Republic;
OP2. Expresses its alarm at the allegations of use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, in particular the alleged incident in Douma on 7 April 2018, notes its outrage that individuals reportedly continue to be killed and injured by chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, and reiterates its determination that those responsible must be held accountable;
OP3. Welcomes the decision of the OPCW Director-General to send  the FFM experts for investigation  in accordance with the CWC to the site of the alleged incident in Douma and adjacent areas  and requests the FFM to report the results of this investigation to the OPCW Executive Council  as soon as possible and further requests the Director-General to keep the Security Council informed of the progress;
OP4. Expresses its full support to the OPCW FFM, demands that all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic shall without any delay facilitate free and safe access for the FFM to relevant sites as well as provide any information and evidence, including, but not limited to, medical records, interview tapes and transcripts, and documentary material, in accordance with resolution 2118, in relation to the alleged incident in Douma and adjacent areas;
OP 5. Recalls that in its resolutions 2118 and 2235 it decided that all parties in the Syrian Arab Republic shall cooperate fully with the OPCW and the United Nations;
OP 6. Emphasises that this includes the obligation of all the parties in  the Syrian Arab Republic of complying with their relevant provisions, by accepting personnel designated by the OPCW or the United Nations, by ensuring the security of activities undertaken by these personnel and providing these personnel with immediate and unfettered access to the site of the alleged incident in Douma and adjacent areas; 
OP 7. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution, and on compliance by all relevant parties in the Syrian Arab Republic, within 15 days of adoption of this resolution and thereafter within the framework of its reporting on resolution 2118 (2013).

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Friday, February 23, 2018

Latest draft resolution on "cessation of hostilities" in Syria


The Security Council,
        Recalling its resolutions 2042 (2012)2043 (2012)2118 (2013)2139 (2014)2165 (2014)2175 (2014)2191 (2014)2209 (2015)2235 (2015)2249 (2015)2254 (2015)2258 (2015)2268 (2016)2286 (2016)2332 (2016)2336 (2016) and 2393 (2017), and its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011 (S/PRST/2011/16), 21 March 2012 (S/PRST/2012/6), 5 April 2012 (S/PRST/2012/10), 2 October 2013 (S/PRST/2013/15), 24 April 2015 (S/PRST/2015/10) and 17 August 2015 (S/PRST/2015/15), 
        Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
        Reiterating its grave distress at the continued severity of the devastating humanitarian situation in Syria, including in Eastern Ghouta, Idlib Governorate, Northern Hama Governorate, Rukhban and Raqqa, and at the fact that urgent humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance, is now required by more than 13.1 million people in Syria, of whom 6.1 million are internally displaced, 2.5 million are living in hard-to-reach areas, including Palestinian refugees, and hundreds of thousands of civilians are trapped in besieged areas,
        Expressing outrage at the unacceptable levels of violence escalating in several parts of the country, in particular in Idlib Governorate and Eastern Ghouta but also Damascus City, including shelling on diplomatic premises, and at attacks against civilians, civilian objects and medical facilities, further compounding suffering and displacing large numbers of people, recalling in this regard the legal obligations of all parties under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as well as all relevant decisions of the Security Council, especially to cease all attacks against civilians and civilian objects, including those involving attacks on schools and medical facilities,
        Expressing concern for those returning to areas, including those retaken from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), that are contaminated by explosive remnants of war and need resilience and stabilization support and expressing disturbance at the humanitarian situation in Raqqa,
        Reiterating its deep disturbance at the lack of United Nations humanitarian access to besieged populations in recent months, expressing grave alarm at the dire situation of the hundreds of thousands of civilians trapped in besieged areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, especially in Eastern Ghouta, Yarmouk, Foua and Kefraya, and reaffirming that sieges directed against civilian populations in Syria are a violation of international humanitarian law, and calling for the immediate lifting of all sieges,
        Expressing its disturbance at the humanitarian situation for  those stranded in Rukhban and stressing in this regard the need to ensure humanitarian access to Rukhban from inside Syria and the need for a sustainable solution,
        Noting the ongoing work on de-escalation areas to reduce violence as a step towards a comprehensive nation-wide ceasefire, emphasizing the need for all parties to respect their commitments to existing ceasefire agreements, and that humanitarian access must be granted as part of these efforts in accordance with international humanitarian law,
        Reaffirming that Member States must ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations under international law, in particular international human rights, refugee and humanitarian law,
        Emphasizing that the humanitarian situation will continue to deteriorate further in the absence of a political solution to the Syrian conflict in line with resolution 2254 (2015)calling upon all parties to make progress in this regard and to undertake confidence-building measures, including the early release of any arbitrarily detained persons, particularly women and children,
        Expressing outrage at the insufficient implementation of its resolutions 2139 (2014)2165 (2014)2191 (2014)2258 (2015)2268 (2016)2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017),
        Determining that the devastating humanitarian situation in Syria continues to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region,
        Underscoring that Member States are obligated under Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations to accept and carry out the Council’s decisions,
        1.     Demands that all parties immediately cease hostilities for an initial period of 30 consecutive days throughout Syria to enable the delivery of humanitarian aid and services and medical evacuations of the critically sick and wounded, in accordance with applicable international law;
        2.     Affirms that the cessation of hostilities shall not apply to military operations against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, also known as Da’esh), Al Qaeda and Al Nusra Front (ANF), and all other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with Al Qaeda or ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the Security Council;
        3.     Calls upon all parties to respect and fulfil their commitments to existing ceasefire agreements, including the full implementation of resolution 2268, furthermore calls upon all Member States to use their influence with the parties to ensure implementation of the cessation of hostilities, the fulfilment of existing commitments and to support efforts to create conditions for a durable and lasting ceasefire and stresses the need for relevant guarantees from those Member States;
        4.     Calls upon all relevant Member States to coordinate efforts to monitor the cessation of hostilities, building on existing arrangements;
        5.     Further demands that, immediately after the start of the cessation of hostilities, all parties shall allow safe, unimpeded and sustained access each week for United Nations’ and their implementing partners’ humanitarian convoys, including medical and surgical supplies, to all requested areas and populations according to United Nations’ assessment of need in all parts of Syria, in particular to those 5.6 million people in 1,244 communities in acute need, including the 2.9 million people in hard-to-reach and besieged locations, subject to standard UN security assessment;
        6.     Demands moreover that, immediately after the start of the cessation of hostilities, all parties shall allow the United Nations and its implementing partners to undertake safe, unconditional medical evacuations, based on medical need and urgency, subject to standard UN security assessment;
        7.     Reiterates its demand, reminding in particular the Syrian authorities, that all parties immediately comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law, as applicable, and international humanitarian law, including the protection of civilians as well as to ensure the respect and protection of all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities, and to fully and immediately implement all provisions of all relevant Security Council resolutions;
        8.     Demands that all parties facilitate safe and unimpeded passage for medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their equipment, transport and supplies, including surgical items, to all people in need, consistent with international humanitarian law and reiterates its demand that all parties demilitarize medical facilities, schools and other civilian facilities and avoid establishing military positions in populated areas and desist from attacks directed against civilian objects;
        9.     Takes note with appreciation of the five requests identified by the Emergency Relief Coordinator on 11 January 2018 during his mission to Syria, and calls upon all parties to facilitate the implementation of these five requests and others to ensure principled, sustained and improved humanitarian assistance to Syria in 2018;
        10.    Calls upon all parties to immediately lift the sieges of populated areas, including in Eastern Ghouta, Yarmouk, Foua and Kefraya, and demands that all parties allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including medical assistance, cease depriving civilians of food and medicine indispensable to their survival, and enable the rapid, safe and unhindered evacuation of all civilians who wish to leave, and underscores the need for the parties to agree on humanitarian pauses, days of tranquillity, localized ceasefires and truces to allow humanitarian agencies safe and unhindered access to all affected areas in Syria, recalling that starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited by international humanitarian law;
        11.    Calls for humanitarian mine action to be accelerated as a matter of urgency throughout Syria;
        12.    Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution, and on compliance by all relevant parties in Syria, within 15 days of adoption of this resolution and thereafter within the framework of its reporting on resolutions 2139 (2014)2165 (2014)2191 (2014)2258 (2015)2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017);
        13.    Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Thursday, November 2, 2017

Russian draft calls on JIM to "reevaluate earlier assessments, conclusions"

The Security Council,
Recalling its resolutions 2319 (2016), 2314 (2016), 2253 (2015), 2235 (2015), 2209 (2015), 2178 (2014), 2118 (2013), 1989 (2011), 1540 (2004) and 1267(1999),
Condemning in the strongest terms any use of chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic and expressing grave concern that civilians continue to be killed and injured by chemical weapons and toxic chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,
Reaffirming that the use of chemical weapons constitutes a serious violation of international law and reiterating that those individuals, entities, groups or governments responsible for any use of chemical weapons must be held accountable,
Recalling the decision of the OPCW Executive Council EC-86/DEC.9 dated 13 October 2017, which encouraged States Parties to share, according to their national laws and as appropriate, information related to cases of developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining, transferring, or using chemical weapons by non-state actors, as well as domestic investigations conducted with regard to chemical weapons, including information on any subsequent criminal or other legal proceedings undertaken,
Welcoming full and profound cooperation extended by the government of the Syrian Arab Republic to the FFM and JIM in establishing facts related to the incidents with chemical weapons in Um-Housh and Khan Shaykhun,
Noting that the government of the Syrian Arab Republic called upon the FFM and JIM to conduct the investigation at the scene in Khan Shaykhun and granted access to its Shayrat airbase, thus enabling the JIM and OPCW experts to verify its premises by taking environmental samples for the presence of traces of sarin as it was allegedly delivered from there and used in Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017, interviewing in this regard the airbase staff, examining logbooks and aircraft stationed there,
Expressing its regret that the FFM and JIM failed to visit Khan Shaykhun and to collect environmental samples at Shayrat airbase although the necessary security and technical conditions, as the Council learnt, were in place,
Expressing also its regret that the samples the FFM relied on in the course of investigation lacked full chain of custody envisaged in the working instruction of the OPCW Technical Secretariat "Chain of Custody and Documentation for OPCW Samples On-site",
Recalling that resolution 2319 encouraged the JIM to consult appropriate United Nations counter-terrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange information on non-state actors' perpetration, organization, sponsorship, or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic,
Recalling that resolution 2319 reaffirmed the JIM's ability to examine additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared by the FFM but was related to the mandate of the JIM,
Recalling further that the United Nations Secretary-General in his letter to the President of the Security Council on 27 August 2015 committed to undertake the recruitment of impartial and experienced staff of the JIM to provide the relevant requisite skill sets on the basis of professional expertise and experience, with due regard to the importance of recruiting staff on as wide geographical basis as possible, which fully applies to the FFM, as provided in its terms of reference and the CWC,
Noting that the FFM continues to examine other allegations of chemical weapons use in Syria, unfortunately once again in a remote mode, which does not allow to ensure the necessary quality of the investigation,
Expressing further alarm that chemical weapons have been used in Syria by non-state actors and that the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIL or Da'esh), the Al Nusrah Front and other non-state actors used or have shown obvious intent to develop, acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer, or use chemical weapons,
Reaffirming that no party in the Syrian Arab Republic should use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer chemical weapons,
Having considered the seventh and the previous reports of the JIM,
Proceeding from the understanding that in view of the experience gained, there is the need for further improvements and update of the JIM's mandate as it was envisaged in paragraph 1 of resolution 2319,
1. Decides to renew the mandate of the JIM, as set out in resolution 2319 and in this resolution, until 16 May 2018 with a possibility of further extension and update by the Security Council if it deems necessary;
2. Reaffirms paragraphs 1-4, 6-9, and 12 of resolution 2235 as amended, where appropriate, by this resolution;
3. Requests the JIM to dispatch as soon as possible an investigative team to the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun to conduct full-scale investigation using the whole spectrum of relevant methods;
4. Urges all parties in Syria and Member States with relevant capabilities to facilitate without any further delay free and safe access for JIM's experts to the site of the incident in Khan Shaykhun and adjacent areas;
5. Requests the JIM to dispatch immediately another investigative team to Shayrat airbase in the Syrian Arab Republic to collect environmental samples in order to verify the allegations that sarin used in Khan Shaykhun had been stored at the airbase;
6. Requests the JIM in the light of paragraph 8 of its seventh report to reevaluate its earlier assessments and conclusions, paying special attention to the incident with chemical weapons in the town of Sarmin since the JIM itself described as "improbable" the eventuality in which a chlorine-filled barrel bomb, dropped from a helicopter, could have impacted through the ventilation shaft with a matching dimension;
7. Decides that the JIM in conducting its investigations must be guided by high standards established by the CWC and, accordingly, use the whole spectrum of relevant methods envisaged in the above-mentioned Convention and in particular Part XI of its Annex on implementation and verification, which includes investigation, sampling, interviewing witnesses and collection of evidence and information on the site of an incident;
8. Requests the JIM in addition to provisions of paragraph 7 above to make use of the recommendations contained in its fourth and fifth reports (paragraph 49 and paragraph 11 respectively) in order to ensure full scale, professional and high quality investigations;
9. Directs the JIM in the course of its investigations to make full use of evidence collected by the FFM in accordance with the CWC high standards, as referred to in paragraph 7 above;
10. Requests the JIM to retain its findings and the findings of the FFM, not based on the results of on-site investigation, as well as remotely collected evidence and information until such time, when full-scale and high quality investigation on the site of an incident becomes possible;
11. Decides that any JIM's investigation shall indispensably involve collection and analysis of additional information and evidence that was not obtained or prepared by the FFM but was related to the mandate of the JIM, including all information provided by the Syrian Arab Republic as well as others pertaining to activities of non-state actors with regard to using, developing, producing, acquiring, stockpiling, retaining or transferring chemical weapons;
12. Calls on the JIM and FFM to engage into the closest cooperation on all the identified cases of the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic in order for the investigation to be as full and comprehensive as possible, with the involvement of all the necessary procedures and methods;
13. Reiterates its support expressed in paragraph 5 of resolution 2209 for the OPCW Executive Council decision of 4 February 2015 to entrust the OPCW FFM with the task "to study all available information relating to allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria" and underlines that paragraph 5 or other provisions of its resolution 2235 do not affect this tasking and do not limit it to determination that a specific incident in Syria involved or likely involved the use of chemical weapons only;
14. Urges the FFM to timely inform the JIM through the Director General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, in accordance with the JIM's mandate as the OPCW-UN joint instrument, on the inability to organize an on-site inspection within the process of investigating a chemical incident in order to make the UN Security Council be aware of the problem;
15. Requests the Director General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to urgently provide the JIM, in the case of a necessity, with technical experts possessing protective gear and special equipment, who would be able to work on the site of an incident as a part of the JIM's team, to collect samples as well as process them in accordance with the standard OPCW procedures of collecting and analyzing authentic samples including, where applicable, their express analysis;
16. Encourages the JIM to consult and cooperate with appropriate United Nations counterterrorism and non-proliferation bodies, in particular the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 and 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee, in order to exchange information on non-state actors' perpetration, organization, sponsorship, or other involvement in the use of chemicals as weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;
17. Invites the UN Secretary-General to ensure recruiting personnel for the JIM in accordance with paragraph 6 of resolution 2235 on as wide geographical basis as possible and recommends the Director General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat to review the composition of the FFM in the light of paragraph 8 of its terms of reference;
18. Calls on all other states to cooperate fully with the JIM and in particular to provide it and the FFM with any relevant information they may possess pertaining to individuals, entities, groups, or governments who were perpetrators, organizers, sponsors or otherwise involved in use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic;
19. Requests the UN Secretary-General, in coordination with the Director General of the OPCW Technical Secretariat, to submit to the Security Council, for its authorization, within 20 days of the adoption of this resolution, recommendations on possible additional measures, if necessary, on strengthening the JIM in the light of this resolution, and expresses its intent to respond to the recommendations within five days of their receipt;
20Requests the JIM to submit to the Council and the OPCW Executive Council by 1 February 2018 and 1 May 2018 the reports on the results of its investigations conducted in full accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8 above;
21. Requests the JIM to collect and analyze information on trends in the activities of non-state actors involving preparations for use and actual use of chemical weapons and submit to the Council relevant analytical reports in the middle and at the end of its new term;
22. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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